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Art’s visual efﬁcacy
The case of Anthony Forge’s Abelam corpus
JAKUB STEJSKAL
The new millennium has witnessed art history’s
renewed effort to become a more inclusive discipline
and assume a more global agenda (Onians 1996;
Belting 2001; Zijlmans 2003; Summers 2003; Pasztory
2005; Elkins 2007b; Van Damme and Zijlmans 2008;
Davis 2011), which has brought it closer to areas of
research traditionally reserved for anthropology and
archaeology. The emerging ﬁeld of world art studies aims
to broaden the horizon of art history beyond its traditional
canonical conﬁnes by dismantling the arbitrary historical
and geographic limitations placed on what passes as
suitable subject matter for research. However, unlike its
predecessor, visual culture studies, it strives to do so
without theorizing away the concept of art itself (Elkins
2007b; Van Damme and Zijlmans 2008). Such a mission
brings with it many potential problems (for a list, see
Elkins 2007a). This article intends to address one of them,
namely, the question of whether a general method is
capable of accommodating the vast array of contexts in
which art objects are studied. I propose a framework for
such a general method that is, however, limited to a
speciﬁc research task: reconstructing the circumstances
under which a culturally and/or temporally distant or
“exotic” art object becomes interesting (or menacing) to
look at. This framework is broadly sympathetic to some
of the recent developments in art history, archaeology,
and anthropology that share a pragmatic, as opposed to
semantic, orientation.
The proposed framework will be applied to evaluate
Anthony Forge’s essays on the visual art of the Abelam—
what I will refer to as the Abelam corpus. The essays
played a central role in the rekindling of anthropological
interest in visual art (Morphy 1994, 660), but they have
also been subject to criticism for forcing on Abelam
art Western categories that distort the role art objects
play in the Abelam world (O’Hanlon 1992; Roscoe
1995; Losche 1995, 1997, 2001). Assessing the corpus
in terms of the proposed framework will allow me to
exemplify the main differences between a pragmatic and
a semantic approach to gaining access to the efﬁcacy of
culturally or temporally distant art.
I
Anthony Forge, “the ﬁrst British anthropologist to
focus primarily on art” (Morphy and Perkins 2006a, 37),
conducted ﬁeld work among the Abelam in the East
Sepik province of Papua New Guinea in the late 1950s
and early 1960s and consequently published a series of
inﬂuential essays on Abelam art (ﬁg. 1; Forge 1966,
[1967] 2006, 1970, 1973a, 1973b, 1979). Forge’s
Abelam corpus registers the great energy and skill
invested in producing ritual art in a community generally
involved in almost no exegesis of its meaning. Forge
reports that wooden carvings and sago spathe paintings
were central to ritual contexts of the Abelam and
inﬂuenced their noncultic, decorative art ([1967] 2006,
110; 1970, 279), but when he inquired into the meaning
of the form, style, or iconography of their art, the
Abelam gave very little information.1 His informants
usually stopped at afﬁrming the chosen style or design as
ritually effective (“That is the effective way”) and
ancestrally sanctioned (“That is how it has always been
done” [Forge 1966, 23]), at most linking a certain design
with a certain clan (Forge 1979, 278). Iconographic
identiﬁcation did not usually go beyond recognizing and
labeling a certain design or object as an animal, a human
feature, a spiritual entity, or an ancestral spirit (Forge
1966, 28), but even then interpretation often varied from
interpreter to interpreter (Forge 1970, 288–89). The
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Figure 1. Abelam man in headdress, 1976, Apangai village. Photo: Diane Losche. Courtesy of
Diane Losche. Color version available as an online enhancement.
designs of spirits were never said to look like their
referents, and never did the designs and carvings
represent a narrative or a scene from a myth (Forge 1979,
279); explanations grounding the stylistic and
iconographic choices in myth were completely lacking
(Forge 1966, 23). Initiates, Forge tells us, received little
instruction for initiation ceremonies during which
carvings and paintings were put on display and had no
knowledge of what was happening to them (1970, 275,
278); the initiators themselves did not know or—as Forge
is quick to add—refused to verbalize the symbolism and
meaning of a large part of the ceremonies (288). To sum
up Forge’s account, the indigenous exegesis stopped at
classifying the compositional features of a design, that is,
providing often unstable “referential labels,” and did not
include a discourse on their meaning (1979, 279).
Forge thus gained little headway by approaching
Abelam paintings and carvings as overt expressions,
or “illustrations” as he liked to put it, of myth or religion
that would be open to verbalization. According to
Forge, this could partly be explained by the fact that
the Abelam had very few origin myths that, moreover,
played little role in their lives and rituals; their art
therefore could not be read as providing illustrations of
cosmological or mythical narratives (1966, 24; see also
Anderson 2004, 87). But this assertion only led Forge
to a more pressing question: what, then, does Abelam
art express (1966, 28)? Forge developed an interpretation
of the architecture of the Abelam ceremonial houses
(haus tambaran or korombo), the paintings on their façades,
the rituals of long yam cultivation, and the carvings of
the nggwalndu clan spirits that was to support his thesis
that in societies where one ﬁnds a lot of plastic art,
relative stylistic uniformity, but little exegesis, art functions
as an autonomous communication system expressing
substantial values of these societies (1966, 30; 1973b,
177; 1979, 283–84).
II
Ignoring for the moment the speciﬁcs of Forge’s
interpretative difﬁculties with Abelam art, one can
identify in his troubles an extreme case of a common
epistemic situation in anthropology, archaeology, and
material culture studies: a need to reconstruct the
meaning and impact of culturally or geographically
distant material objects whose function is perceived by
the researcher to be conditioned on their being offered
(or denied) to a gaze—or, to put it in more familiar
terms, a need to reconstruct the historical and cultural
circumstances under which an artifact becomes (or is
perceived as aspiring to be) interesting to look at.
Forge’s is an extreme case, because he ﬁnds himself
in a situation where he seems to lack any exegetical
resources that would help him explain the importance
of the art he is studying. In this respect, his situation is
not much different from that of an archaeologist studying
the material remains of an object she believes was put
on display during important moments of the communal
life of an ancient society about whose belief system
she knows next to nothing.2 To coin a term, both Forge
and the imaginary archaeologist are interested in the
conditions of the artifacts’ “visual efﬁcacy.”
When I am thirsty, I look at a pitcher of water with
the desire to quench my thirst. The pitcher becomes
visually efﬁcacious because my merely looking at it
satisﬁes my urge to ﬁnd a source of potable liquid. By
contrast, art objects are typically visually efﬁcacious by
being “strange” or “difﬁcult”; they are formatted to arrest
and hold the observer’s attention.3 Art objects’ visual
presence (or, sometimes, absence) allows them to be
efﬁcacious by hindering one’s habitual interactions with
one’s environment—they may require further handling
or manipulation to fulﬁll their function (whether practical,
votive, or communal), but it is their visual presence that
arrests attention and indexes their purpose. In this sense,
art objects are visual objects of authority: their striking
visibility is used to mark or underline their authoritative
presence or purposefulness. Things typically become
unusually visible when they malfunction, but what I have
in mind is a “functional,” efﬁcacious unusual visibility—
that is, a striking visibility that enables the object to serve
a function. Striking in this sense are those features of an
artifact that one becomes aware of by sight and that hold
attention. At the same time, to become responsive to
such striking features presupposes an acquired ability to
perceive them as relevant (Walton 2008). We might call
this ability “categorical sensitivity,” but it is also positional:
it allows one to assume not just conceptual but also
appropriate spatial and temporal coordinates with respect
to the art object (Summers 2003; Pichler and Ubl 2014,
136–211). Precisely because it is a matter of sensitivity,
the appropriateness of the categories and coordinates is
2. The similarity has also been noted in Anderson (2004, 92).
3. Gell (1998, 23) describes art as difﬁcult in this sense; Noë
(2015) understands art as a “strange tool,” by which he means that
artists implement techniques of producing and acting embedded in a
community’s form of life in impractical ways, creating strange objects.
The term “visual difﬁculty” has recently, and more narrowly, been
employed by Rothstein (2014/15) in discussing mechanical puzzles.
For Dissanayake (1995, 45–56), “making special” is an essential
feature of art behaviors.
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precarious and subject to recursive inﬂuences between
the demands and expectations of individual sensitivities
and the production of art objects (Davis 2011; Noë 2015,
29–48).
The terms “visual efﬁcacy” and “striking visibility”
are deliberately vague about the kinds of appreciation
or reaction mandated by artifacts typically studied by
historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists of visual
art. All they stipulate is that an art object is visually
efﬁcacious when it elicits, in virtue of its striking visibility,
a response that this kind of art object aspires to.4
The unusual visibility characteristic of art objects does
not have to reside at the level of elaborate or striking
morphology. In order to be visually efﬁcacious, an art
object needs to serve a certain function by means of
being offered to a gaze (or, as the case may be, being
denied to it). An object can become efﬁcacious in
virtue of its striking visibility because of its material,
size, speciﬁc placement, or some combination of these,
rather than its elaborate form (Summers 2003, 259,
284). It might also be striking and therefore efﬁcacious
because it substitutes or references other objects (284) or
even because it is difﬁcult to get a glimpse of. All these
aspects may serve as the striking component that binds
the object with a speciﬁc function. To recognize these
efﬁcacious objects as art objects is to allow a broad
range of artifacts to pass the threshold of art and at the
same time to limit the range by identifying which of
those artifacts aspire to visual efﬁcacy by means of
striking visibility. It is to acknowledge that in most social
settings such objects are in place and that traditionally,
visual efﬁcacy has been studied under the rubric of art.5
Apart from striking visibility, no special claim to arthood
is made on behalf of any of the various ways objects
may become visually efﬁcacious.6
Forge was interested in what made Abelam art
objects—to use my term—visually efﬁcacious: he wanted
to know what their being offered to a gaze achieved.
The problem, as he saw it, was that he did not have
access to the circumstances that would make the efﬁcacy
intelligible because the Abelam were not able or willing
to provide any comprehensive answers to questions
about the meaning of their art. He thus felt compelled to
reconstruct this meaning by other means. This lack of
access to context and the resulting need for reconstruction
or contextualization (Van Damme 2003, 236; Morphy
and Perkins 2006b, 15) helps to characterize not just
Forge’s interpretative work but also the work of social
scientists and humanists who are faced with the goal of
reconstructing or contextualizing the visual efﬁcacy of
any distant artifact. The category of distance here is
intended to cover both temporal and spatial—that is,
historical and cultural—distance. It is meant to describe
a position in which the researcher lacks straightforward
access to the historical and cultural circumstances of
visual efﬁcacy. Granted, there arguably is no such thing
as straightforward access to these circumstances, but for
an art historian or an anthropologist of art (not to mention
the archaeologist) such a lack of access is pronounced
in the manifest alien character of the objects she studies.
Even if all art necessarily becomes distant art in the
eyes of a critical mind, the situation of the historians,
archaeologists, and anthropologists of art remains
paradigmatic.
So far, I have set up a cross-disciplinary view of a
ﬁeld of research centering around the notions of cultural
and/or temporal distance, striking visibility, and visual
efﬁcacy. These concepts allow us to group together
those anthropological, historical, and archaeological
studies of visual art objects that share the same objective:
the objects they study are approached as distant, that is,
as requiring contextualization that would make one
understand their visual efﬁcacy. To become a candidate
for inclusion in this group of studied objects, an object
must initially be assessed as intended to be visually
4. This is not to rule out cases of visually efﬁcacious objects not
being intended by any human agent to have such a visual efﬁcacy. An
object may acquire efﬁcacious unusual visibility through a nonhuman
intervention (say, lightning splitting a tree trunk in a way that acquires
visual relevance in the given cultural conﬁguration) or an unintentional
change of context, such as a shift in historical circumstances.
5. Davis (2011, 231–32) argues that “academic art history has
done itself a grave disservice when it has delimited itself aesthetically
to the ﬁeld of artifacts made to be unusually visible, what is called
‘art,’ as opposed to the ﬁeld of things seen in the world as aesthetically
pictorialized [i.e., the ﬁeld of pictures].” It could be claimed with
some degree of plausibility that with its focus on unusual visibility the
present essay does little to remedy the situation. In fact, I agree with
the gist of Davis’s remark, which I understand to mean that art history
cannot limit itself to the study of the artifacts “made to be unusually
visible” at the expense of broader research into both the historical and
the natural processes involved in things’ acquiring speciﬁc visibility for
someone (e.g., the visibility of a picture). But I also believe (and doubt
Davis would disagree) that this broader research should include—
rather than avoid—the study of processes involved in artifacts
becoming unusually visible.
6. Neither image (Pichler and Ubl 2014), ﬁguration (Descola
2015), cultural object, nor artifact delineate sufﬁciently the class of
objects that gain efﬁcacy by being strikingly visible. They are either
too broad (cultural object, artifact) or too focused on the process of
depiction (image, ﬁguration), leaving out the possibility of aniconic art
objects (the exceptions to the latter being Belting 2001, 170; Summers
2003, 268).
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efﬁcacious by being made strikingly visible. Whether
this intuition is correct or not is to be decided by the
reconstruction. What such a reconstruction looks for is
an aspect or aspects of the object that are supposed to
draw attention. Its unusual visibility arrests attention and
allows an object to become efﬁcacious.
When assessing the meaning and impact of a distant
art object we may start from an intuition about
where the feature that binds attention is located (e.g.,
morphology, scale, or location) and look for a kind of
visual efﬁcacy that it would channel (turning it into a
status symbol, talisman, jewelry, etc.). Or we may detect
hints of what kind of visual efﬁcacy could be at play
(e.g., the context of use indicating votive practices) and
look for a corresponding “visual trap” (what about this
object made it interesting to look at in the context of
these votive practices).
III
By allowing for visual efﬁcacy to be potentially
independent of the morphological aspects of art, the
proposed methodology refuses to take for granted the
identiﬁcation of visual efﬁcacy with visual effectiveness.
Such an identiﬁcation is typical of formalism as a
historical method, insofar as it accounts for the visual
efﬁcacy of an art object in terms of reconstructing
an autonomous (if historically or culturally speciﬁc)
sensitivity toward form or style: art objects become
visually efﬁcacious by manifesting their morphological
complexity (“signiﬁcant form,” “aesthetic complexity,”
or “formal purposiveness,” to use terms commonly used
in formalist writings) and thus eliciting an aesthetic
experience (Davis 2011, 45–74). By contrast, a semantic
approach argues that isolating morphological complexity
is never enough to explain visual efﬁcacy. As Arthur
Danto famously argued, two visually indistinguishable
objects may mean very different things in different
contexts.7 The consequence is that what makes striking
morphology efﬁcacious in one setting may cease to
be functional or acquire a different visual efﬁcacy in
another. And an object that has apparently not been
stylized in any way may possess striking visibility—that
is, it may arrest attention upon being offered to a gaze—
just in virtue of being placed in a certain spatial or even
intellectual context. A pitcher may be just an ordinary
simple vessel for me, but for someone else in a different
context its shape may mark it as a chalice with a deep
religious meaning; its simple form acquires visual
efﬁcacy it did not have for me.
Semantic approaches deny that morphological
complexity on its own has much explanatory power
regarding the visual efﬁcacy of art objects. They see the
link between unusual visibility and efﬁcacy in terms of
signiﬁcation or expression: art objects become visually
efﬁcacious when their striking visibility serves to signify,
express, or communicate. It is not their morphological
complexity that makes them visually efﬁcacious, since
a sensitivity toward morphological values is always
already shaped by semantic categories. A contrast is
assumed between objects that merely function (i.e.,
function without visual efﬁcacy) and those that signify,
with art objects falling squarely on the latter side of the
divide (Danto 1988).8 To put it simply, the only relevant
visual efﬁcacy the semanticist recognizes is that of
communicating meaning.
Standard anthropological deﬁnitions of art try to
accommodate both the formalist and the semantic strands
of thought by embracing the formula “art is symbolical
and/or aesthetically pleasing” (Layton 1991, 4–6; Morphy
1994, 655; cf. Gell 1998, 5–7). In this regard, they follow
in Forge’s footsteps. He was a formalist insofar as he
believed that the striking visibility of Abelam art objects
was universally accessible, but he was a semanticist
when it came to explaining the ends that the art served.
Faced with the inconsistent and superﬁcial descriptions
of art objects that played such a central role in the
lives of Abelam men, Forge followed his semanticist
commitments and wanted to dig deeper, below the layers
of Abelam consciousness, to recover what he believed
was the true meaning expressed by their art. But the
liberal notion of arthood introduced above, according
to which any object that aspires to gain its efﬁcacy by
being strikingly visible is to be classiﬁed as art, leaves
other options open for explaining the seeming paradox
of Abelam art. That the Abelam did not explain the
meaning of their art to Forge may be indicative of the
art’s striking visibility serving functions that have little
to do with the expression of meaning. The semanticist
bias toward treating art objects as embodied meanings
threatens to disregard the varying conditions that conﬁgure
the kinds of responses to art objects common outside of
the context of the cosmopolitan art world (Gell 2006).
7. For an elaboration of the argument in an ethnographic context,
see Danto (1988). The initial form of the argument is to be found in
Danto (1981).
8. The semanticist allows for cases where a single object can
fall into both categories: it is both a tool and a symbol, so to speak.
But what makes it visually efﬁcacious, and thus a work of art, is its
symbolic function.
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At times, the efﬁcacy through unusual visibility associated
with art in so-called ethnographic or “tribal” contexts
can be described as an expression of meaning only to a
limited degree (Gell 1998). Such art objects may, for
example, induce an emotive reaction, act on behalf of an
absent agent, or motivate a certain behavior. And they
may do such things under circumstances that are hostile
to any sustained contemplation of meaning, or that even
dissuade looking altogether (Morphy 1989). In other
words, expressing meaning is not the only way art objects
acquire visual efﬁcacy, and semantic interpretation is not
the only way of accessing it. An assessment of Forge’s
semantic interpretation from such a pragmatic perspective
will demonstrate this point.
IV
The efﬁcacious scenario that Forge constructs gets off
the ground by identifying the attention-drawing striking
visibility with the aesthetically pleasing design of the
paintings and carvings. Since Forge takes for granted that
aesthetic interest in form is universally communicable
(Forge [1967] 2006, 119), his (or anybody else’s) ability
to appreciate the aesthetic character of the designs does
not really come under discussion. This accessibility of
striking visibility (relying on a questionable objectiﬁcation
of aesthetic form) is for Forge just a ﬁrst step, however,
toward achieving an understanding of the objects’ visual
efﬁcacy. In the next step, it is necessary to explain what
this form expresses.
According to Forge’s interpretation, Abelam art forms
a system of communication where the overt identiﬁcation
of a design is less important than the relationship between
the various symbols. So, for example, the painted façades
of the ritual korombo houses include bands of what
seem at ﬁrst sight to be anthropomorphic depictions of
eyes and facial features, which are typically identiﬁed
as nggwalndu, the central spirits of the Abelam world
(ﬁgs. 2–3). But in the case of a ceremonial house in
Wingei village, Forge’s informants resolutely denied
any anthropomorphic resemblance and identiﬁed the
individual “half-faces” sometimes as cassowaries and
sometimes as “man’s hair” (Forge 1973b, 176 and
plate 4). And Forge described the pattern on the korombo
in Yanuko village as a “row of faces with diamond pattern
round eyes, identiﬁed as butterﬂies” (Forge 1966, plate 7).
Forge noticed that nggwalndu faces identiﬁed as such
were often composed of two halves (ﬁg. 3) resembling
the cassowary/man’s hair designs (Forge 1973b, 176).
Though in each case the graphic designs represented
something different, their composition followed a similar
pattern. This led Forge to believe that maybe what
mattered to the Abelam was not what objects or creatures
their ritual painting represented but rather what elements
they combined. Abelam art, Forge came to believe,
did not reference any concrete reality outside itself but
rather arranged elements that were “collectively and
individually charged with sentiments associated with
ritual, secrecy, and power” (177).
One of the central “messages” of the Abelam
nggwalndu faces is, according to Forge’s interpretation,
the relationship between the female and male principles,
which corresponds to the fundamental opposition of
nature and culture: nggwalndu faces understood as
male are framed by a peaked oval, which embodies the
female principle and is omnipresent in Abelam art. It is
often identiﬁed as vulva, belly, or mother. The korombo
ritual houses themselves are understood as wombs,
inside of which the nggwalndu carvings are placed
and male initiation takes place. Forge believed that this
was the way for the Abelam to express the original
primacy of female, natural creativity over male, cultural
creativity, and that their rituals aimed to counterbalance
male and female creativity (1973b, 189; Anderson 2004,
99–107; but cf. Strathern 1988, 120–35). The harmony
expressed by aesthetic means was made to reﬂect spiritual
harmony, creating a sense of order licensed by the
ancestral powers. This general ability of art to visually tie
together symbolically charged aspects of Abelam culture
is what Forge initially characterized as the communication
of “implicit non-verbal statements” about “the nature of
man and his culture,” which are “relevant to the social
structure”; Forge believed that such statements were rarely
if ever communicated among the Abelam by means other
than visual art (1966, 30).
Forge posited that his Abelam informants declined
or failed to provide answers to questions about deeper
meanings and motivations behind their art because they
were not fully conscious of them. The meanings conveyed
by style were in Forge’s view tied to the unconscious
grammar structure that informed the ambiguous visual
puns and allusions that escaped uninitiated spectators,
just as in a verbal system, one’s sensitivity toward puns
indicates their full mastery of a language. What is displayed,
according to Forge, is a mastery of the semiotic system
and an ability to reﬂect on its structure in meaningful yet
ungraspable ways (1979, 283–84). If the Abelam were to
become fully conscious of the workings of the system, the
system would cease to work; it would be just illustrative,
allegorical. Forge suspected some of his informants
realized this and for this reason did not want to engage
in discussing these matters (285). As the criteria ruling the
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visual communication system remained beyond the
reach of consciousness, the source of the art objects’
visual efﬁcacy was all the more easily associated with the
agency of spirits, thus contributing to the art’s overall
effect (Forge 1973a, xviii–xix; 1979, 284).
Forge’s interpretation of the visual efﬁcacy of Abelam
art has the following conﬁguration: the aesthetic form
creates the attention-drawing striking visibility, which
gains visual efﬁcacy by communicating symbolically the
coherence and harmony of the world. The referential
instability of the designs and general lack of exegesis are
indicative of the nonillustrative character of Abelam art
and its un- or half-conscious workings. But, importantly,
this is not the whole story Forge offers. For he argues
that the inherently ambiguous character of the designs’
references also has a role to play in the art’s visual
efﬁcacy. The referential ambiguity of the designs makes
their stylistic code akin to poetry rather than unclear
prose (1973b, 190–91). With this claim Forge distances
himself from what he calls “iconics,” a visual semiotics
inspired by advances in structural linguistics and
devoted to the project of discovering the grammar and
syntax of visual signs and thus reducing their ambiguity.
For the study of visual symbols as promoted by Forge,
ambiguity is not something to be explained away, but
an essential feature of the symbolic system of visual art
(1973a, xvi–xviii).9 By the ambiguous, polysemous
character of art objects Forge means not just their
denoting or illustrating more than one entity but also
their ability to reference various aspects of the culture
that share a visual pattern exempliﬁed or indexed by the
9. This is not to claim that Forge was not inﬂuenced by semiotics
and structuralism. This inﬂuence is apparent in his treatment of Abelam
art as a closed system of stylistic elements variously combined into
syntactic wholes (1970, 282, 288–89). Forge welcomed the exploits of
Lévi-Straussian structural anthropology, which has strived to identify
parallels between the structure of rituals and myths and the overall
structure of society. Indeed, one could do worse than identify Forge’s
project as a contribution to the structuralist program.
Figure 2. Façade of northern Abelam ceremonial house korombo, detail, 1976, Apangai village. Photo: Diane Losche.
Courtesy of Diane Losche. Color version available as an online enhancement.
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visual symbol, again invoking a sense of the world’s
underlying coherence (xviii). For example, the same
white circle may be labeled both as an eye and a star,
while a spiral shape is variously identiﬁed as “legs of
pork,” “immature fern frond,” or “swirl in the water of a
ﬂooded river” (ﬁg. 4; Forge 1970, 289). Furthermore,
there exists a unity of the face painting style across media:
wooden masks used during yam harvest ceremonies,
carvings placed in the interior of the korombo, and
initiators’ painted faces. This unity is supposed to serve
“one of the most important ‘theological’ functions of
Abelam art” (280), communicating “the ultimate identity
of man, long yam and spirit” (1966, 30). What this unity
of style achieves is “effective communication . . .
enhanced by the aesthetic effect” (1973b, 177).
For Forge, the referential ambiguity invokes a host of
associations and makes the painted designs all the more
effective, while at the same time visually linking familiar
patterns as part of a compact whole and thus intensifying
the “supernatural power” of the objects within their ritual
context (1973a, xix) by creating a web of relationships
that reﬂect “the ritual and cosmological order” (1970,
290). And because the consumers of the art appreciate
these links without any act of discursive interpretation,
they are experienced directly and with greater force (289–
90). Apart from aesthetic form, this referential ambiguity
is therefore a second contributing factor to the striking
visibility of Abelam art described by Forge. Such a
referential ambiguity makes for a striking visibility because
it increases the authoritative presence of the art objects;
yet it is a kind of striking visibility that does not reside
in morphological complexity. It nevertheless contributes
to the visual efﬁcacy of Abelam art.
V
Forge’s idea of art revolves around the notion of
style as a limited set of graphic options available to an
artist working in a given medium. The Abelam artist is
driven in his stylistic choices by universal aesthetic
sensibilities that inform the composition of the art object.
The juxtaposition of individual visual elements creates
a symbolic meaning that is mostly not communicated
otherwise and does not even enter the full consciousness
of the producer or the consumer. The aesthetic pleasure
experienced along with the semantic content received
are misidentiﬁed by them as the effect of the agency of
ancestral spirits.
Forge’s Abelam corpus has exercised great inﬂuence on
the study of Melanesian and Paciﬁc art in general. Many
others followed in Forge’s footsteps, further developing his
semantic interpretation (e.g., Gell 1975; Kaufmann 1979;
Bowden 1983; Hanson 1983a, 1983b; Dubinskas and
Traweek 1984; Silitoe 1980, 1988; Rosman and Rubel
1990; Guddemi 1993; Hauser-Schäublin 1994; Tuzin
1980, 1995; Morphy 2005). But in the 1990s several
papers appeared that questioned Forge’s method.10 The
change in attitude is signaled in Michael O’Hanlon’s
“Unstable Images and Second Skins” (1992). O’Hanlon
endorsed Forge’s observation that Melanesians traditionally
do not engage in verbal exegesis of their ritual art and
when they do, there is much ambiguity involved (590).
Figure 3. Two nggwalndu heads, façade of northern Abelam
korombo, detail, 1976, Apangai village. Photo: Diane
Losche. Courtesy of Diane Losche. Color version available
as an online enhancement.
10. But see the misgivings expressed already in Silitoe (1988,
315–16).
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Figure 4. Abelam headdress with spiral motifs, 1976, unspeciﬁed location. Photo: Diane Losche.
Courtesy of Diane Losche. Color version available as an online enhancement.
But taking inspiration from Marilyn Strathern’s and Roy
Wagner’s conceptualizations of Melanesian attitudes
toward images (Wagner 1986; Strathern [1990] 2013),
he called for a differentiation between two ways of
verbalizing art. Forge’s category of exegesis is, O’Hanlon
argued, just one way of speaking about art. The persistent
ambiguity with regard to the art object’s reference may
be a sign of little interest in a particular kind of exegesis,
but does not mean that no discourse about art is
present. O’Hanlon claims that—pace Forge—there exists
a kind of talk that is “the local form which exegesis
takes in Melanesia” (O’Hanlon 1992, 605), namely,
interpreting the object in terms of its effects, that is, in
terms of how the mindset and actions of those who are
exposed to it are affected by it. This step signals a major
methodological reorientation—though it is undersold by
O’Hanlon himself. His assertion that verbalization is not
missing among the Melanesians but that it is centered
on art’s consequences rather than its represented meaning
opens the possibility that reconstructing the visual
efﬁcacy of an art object is not necessarily a matter of
establishing what its morphology and style help to
communicate but rather a matter of contextualizing the
object in terms of its impact. What is beginning to gain
contours is an alternative to the conclusion that the
absence of an elaborate exegetical tradition that would
match an elaborate art production must point to a
nondiscursive communication. This alternative would
treat the absence of discourse about meaning as a
symptom of a different function of art: not that of a
communicator, but of a doer.
A more direct attack on Forge and “semantic
interpretation” in general was undertaken by Paul
Roscoe (1995). Roscoe’s charge is that Forge remains
wedded to the problematic functionalist position that
treats social institutions as serving functions beyond the
comprehension or intention of the individual agents
who carry them out: If these agents realize certain
intentions unconsciously, then who is the subject that
intends them? This problem of teleology is formulated
by Roscoe in terms of motivation: the haus tambaran
of the Yangoru Boiken, neighbors of the Abelam, has
traditionally been built by entitled clans. What would
motivate these clans, asks Roscoe, to express general
meanings about the relationship of culture and nature
“beyond a sense of public service” (1995, 4)? For
Roscoe, it is much more plausible that the clan members
are motivated by their group interests and that the
construction of a large ritual house serves to demonstrate
the clan’s political power and prestige (7). As Roscoe
realizes, such an answer avoids addressing the question
of why the stylistic ornamentation looks the way it does.
After all, it may still be the case that the building
manifests the clan’s prestige and at the same time
communicates through style essential truths about the
community as a whole. But to Roscoe it seems more
plausible that the designs on the painted façade of the
haus tambaran are there to affect audiences rather than
communicate meanings to them. The use of colors and
symbols serves to induce “the feeling of a powerful
and threatening presence” (14) in those outside of the
clan, whereas its members experience the “affecting
presence” of the ceremony house as the effect of the
potency of their clan (15). The builders’ “aim was not to
communicate, to themselves or others, some semantic
message along the lines of, ‘We are powerful and
dangerous’; rather, it was to force themselves and others
to feel this power and danger” (15). The problem with
such a statement is that it is not at all clear why inducing
a feeling of power and danger cannot constitute an act
of communicating meaning, albeit in a more visceral
way; in fact, this was one of Forge’s points. As O’Hanlon
noted in his reaction to Roscoe’s paper, Forge himself
claimed that art communicated in a more direct fashion
and through inducing emotion (O’Hanlon and Roscoe
1995, 832). Roscoe in his reply (833) stressed that Sepik
art objects’ inducing emotional states should not be
seen as communicating a deep cultural meaning, but
as the desired effect brought about thanks to, among
other things, semantic means. To put it in my terms,
the façades do not become visually efﬁcacious by
representing deep meaning as Forge conjectured, but
rather when they have emotional impact (fear or
empowerment); no elaborate metaphysical message
about the state of things is involved.11
The most thorough criticism of Forge’s semantic
interpretation came from Diane Losche, who had
conducted ﬁeld research among the Abelam some
twenty years after Forge (1995, 1997, 2001).12 Losche
proposed that the apparent instability of verbal exegesis
11. Forge was not blind to the effects the Abelam took their art
to have. He recounts, for example, how one Abelam village decided
to change the style of the painted korombo façade to a style used
by another village more successful at growing long yams, clearly
believing that the painting style affects the harvest (Forge [1967] 2006,
118). When Forge tried to explain what made the art effective, however,
he assumed that the effect could only be the result of expressed
meaning: the ritual paintings and carvings were seen by the Abelam
as affecting yam harvest because they were susceptible to their
communicated symbolic meaning.
12. Losche conducted her ﬁeld research among the Abelam in the
late 1970s (1997, 37).
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that had bothered Forge disappeared when one fully
understood the nature of this exegesis and its role in
the social structure of the Abelam. She argued that
Forge’s quest to ﬁnd “stable referents,” although of the
most abstract kind and lodged in the unconscious,
was informed by the supposition that an image must
represent something other than itself and that the aim
of the anthropologist is to uncover the semiotic link
between the signiﬁer and signiﬁed, and to do so even
if the indigenous informants do not provide it (1997,
39–40). To treat images primarily as representations has
for Losche been the dominant Western way of dealing
with visual marks, epitomized by the allegory of the
cave from Plato’s Republic, and Forge did not escape
this paradigm. But to be fair to him (and as we have
seen), Forge himself criticized those semiotic approaches
that modeled visual communication on the verbal and
sought to verbalize visual signs without remainder. Yet
Losche is right insofar as Forge clung to the broader
assumption that the main function of art images was to
communicate meanings even if they communicated
relationships rather than concrete ideas. According to
Losche’s reading, Abelam designs’ instability of reference
acquires in Forge’s essays a status similar to the abstract
expressionists’ rejection of ﬁguration: removing the
assumption that art objects must have stable referents
emancipates art from being mere illustration, allowing
it to become an autonomous medium of expression.
The problem with such a perspective, Losche argues,
is that while it upholds the Abelam as “serious cultural
producers,” it is the product of aesthetic anxieties that
could not be further removed from the concerns of the
Abelam (41). In the Western world, paintings are supposed
to mean, whereas refrigerators are supposed to function;
among the Abelam, no such distinction exists (Losche
1995, 59).
Losche joins O’Hanlon and Roscoe in ascribing to
Melanesian aesthetics a practical sensitivity toward art
objects. These become visually efﬁcacious not by using
morphology to represent or communicate meaning, but
by primarily producing effects in their vicinity, that is,
by causing change in the state of things. Losche and
O’Hanlon also stress that this is how Abelam themselves
conceive and speak of their art’s functioning. The Abelam
assess art objects in terms of their effect—that is, in terms
of their power to transform attitudes and desires (Losche
1997, 44–45). Per Losche’s interpretation, shapes such
as the spiral used in carvings and paintings central to
initiation and yam rituals help generate change in the
mental state of the participants. The main role of Abelam
art is to rechannel male attraction away from the opposite
sex and toward the growing of long yams and the rituals
attached to the korombo house (1995, 57–58). “The
apparent lack of congruence between visual design and
verbal referent” (51) disappears when one treats groups
of identical graphic elements not as representing the
same object, but as reproducing the same function
(1997, 46). In the world of the Abelam a spiral shape
variously identiﬁed by Forge’s informants as “legs of
pork,” “immature fern frond,” or swirling water (Forge
1970, 289) is meant to reproduce their shared generative
function: one gives a leg of pork to one’s exchange
partner, initiating a whole series of exchanges; immature
fern frond hides inside itself many leaves waiting to be
unfurled; swirls of water indicate places in a river where
“spirits involved with conception” reside (Losche 1995,
53–54). By reproducing the shape, the design partakes
of the generative effect as well, and starts to “act as a
machine or apparatus for inducing transformation in
other things or persons” (54).13
VI
Forge approaches the Abelam culture equipped
with a methodology that explicitly moves beyond the
overt uses of and responses to art objects. He explains
the look and effect of Abelam art objects by recourse
to the Abelam worldview that unconsciously motivates
the distribution of colors and shapes expressing this
worldview. Style is reiﬁed as a set of alternatives
following a “grammar” that translates the normative
bedrock on which Abelam society is based into visual
terms. This bedrock is reiﬁed into an unconscious
collective agency motivating the visual style.
A semantic project like Forge’s assumes—like other
structuralist and interpretative approaches—that the
visual efﬁcacy of art objects rests on expressing through
a uniﬁed style a system of cultural values potentially
accessible to the distanced analytic gaze of the researcher,
even if there is—in extreme cases like that of Forge’s
Abelam—little record or testimony that would corroborate
such an interpretation. The visual efﬁcacy of art objects is
anchored in their inherited and relatively homogeneous
13. In her article of 2001, Losche offers another explanation for
the apparent referential instability of Abelam designs. She challenges
Forge’s assumption that this instability is a sign of the inconsequence
of the verbal identiﬁcation of these patterns, and argues that quite the
opposite is the case. The identiﬁcation of designs depends on the
varying contexts of exchange in which they are uttered. The establishing
of a referential link is akin to the revelation of a secret; it has the nature
of a gift.
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style, which expresses deeply ingrained shared meanings.
This assumption appears plausible on the condition that
symbolic content can be communicated non-verbally
and unconsciously (Lévi-Strauss 1955, 1963; Hanson
1983b). No matter what overt function the object in
question serves in its original environment, it can also
communicate meanings that are richer and more
profound than those pertaining to its use and iconography.
These interpretations rely on the assumption that art
objects are somehow marinated in the historical, cultural,
or psychological present of their production and thus
“express” or “signify” it.14
This assumption involves a double reiﬁcation: the
reiﬁcation of content into a “collective unconscious”
that informs art, and the reiﬁcation of general style into
a commonly shared visual “language” of forms that is
somehow motivated by the reiﬁed content. The task of
the researcher is then to “reconstruct the socio-cultural
reality in which [art objects] functioned and had their
meanings” with the hope that “[o]nce this is done,
formal features of the [art objects] identiﬁed by the
analyst may be seen to correspond with formal features
of the society’s philosophical and social structure”
(Coote and Shelton 1992, 5). More often than not, one
is left with at best only a metaphorical explanation of
the correspondence, instead of an explanation of how
the conﬁguration of a certain social structure replicates
itself in an art form (Gell 1998, 216–20; Davis 2011,
277–340). This double reiﬁcation and the often speculative,
if not glossed over, nature of the connection between
the social and the stylistic via “signiﬁcation” have made
such strategies of contextualization—practiced in various
structuralist, neo-Marxist, culturalist, and sociological
guises—increasingly problematic to the degree that
there has been a notable shift away from the semantic
paradigm and toward more pragmatic approaches that
focus on the contexts of use and impact rather than
meaning and interpretation.15
The alternative offered by Forge’s critics may arguably
be seen as an early sign of the paradigm shift.16 Because
these contributions formulate their criticism from
different standpoints and draw on different material, their
common agenda is easy to miss—and, to the best of my
knowledge, has yet to be noted. The perspective outlined
above enables us to identify in these contributions a
distinct common line of argument: it is not that the
Abelam are unable to reﬂect on the meaning of their art
or half-consciously avoid reﬂecting on it; rather, they
do it in ways that cannot be grasped by the semantic
expressivist schema founded on deriving content from
form. Elements of a pragmatic corrective to Forge’s
enterprise can thus be gleaned from some of the
critiques of his work from the 1990s. When put together,
these elements support a more general statement: by
characterizing referential ambiguity and a lack of
exegesis as symptoms of unconscious symbolic
communication, Forge’s semantic model of the visual
efﬁcacy of traditional Melanesian art underestimates
the indigenous understanding of the art’s workings.
Whatever visual efﬁcacy traditional Melanesian art
objects possess, it cannot be accessed without ﬁrst
taking into account the speciﬁc nexus of causalities and
intentions that they weave around themselves. This
would constitute an effort to contextualize the visual art
object in terms of how it is used or meant to be used in
a given period and area prior to a contextualization
focused on what it is meant to communicate or express.
To use a spatial metaphor, the contextual web around
the art object is not weaved along the vertical axis,
going beyond the surface in order to interpret its striking
visibility as a function of an idea or content. The contextual
web is organized horizontally, consisting of causalities
and intentionalities that specify what intentions and uses
14. Ernst Gombrich was a lifelong relentless critic of “expression.”
See, e.g., Gombrich (1963a, 1963b) and, for a commentary, Summers
(1989).
15. Largely abandoning the vocabulary of representation and
expression associated with Panofskian iconology or neo-Marxist
cultural criticism, art history has been witnessing a revival of interest
in the study of the inner logic of the visual or iconic order (Boehm
1994; Bredekamp 2010; Gaiger 2014) as well as a renewed interest in
anthropological theory, however loosely understood (Didi-Huberman
2000; Belting 2001). In a similar development, postprocessual
archaeology and interpretative anthropology have been challenged
by “non-representational” and “ontological” approaches (Alberti and
Jones 2013; Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007a).
16. What would merit further research is the fact that the
Melanesist criticism of Forge started appearing in print at the same
time that Alfred Gell was formulating the ideas that would appear in
Art and Agency (published posthumously in 1998), one of the most
inﬂuential contributions to the pragmatic shift in visual art studies.
In that book Gell, whose PhD thesis on the rituals of the Umeda of
Papua New Guinea (1975) had been supervised and heavily inﬂuenced
by Forge, renounced the semantic approach and advocated an
anthropology of art that would treat its objects as “intended to change
the world rather than encode symbolic propositions about it” (Gell
1998, 6). Art and Agency continues to serve as a central reference point
in the debates about the agency of artifacts (Henare, Holbraad, and
Wastell 2007b; Knappett and Malafouris 2008; Malafouris 2013), and
Gell’s art nexus theory has been widely discussed in archaeological and
anthropological circles (Osborne and Tanner 2007; Pinney and Thomas
2001).
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the object indexes through its visual presence (or absence).
Its visual efﬁcacy is reconstructed not by decoding its
represented meaning, but by drawing on the context of its
use. This interpretive project is therefore pragmatic or
post-semantic (oriented on use) as opposed to semantic
(oriented on meaning).17
VII
Forge’s semantic commitments prevented him
from considering that the paucity and instability of
interpretations of art’s content could have been the
consequence of a different kind of exegesis that
centered on the impact of art objects rather than their
referential anchoring (O’Hanlon 1992). He likewise did
not consider that the referential ambiguity could have
pointed to a shared functional trait of the referents
(Losche 1995, 1997) or perhaps to the different contexts
in which each referent was denoted (Losche 2001).
O’Hanlon, Roscoe, and Losche have arrived at their
conclusions by steering away from this semantic scenario
that conﬁgures art objects’ efﬁcacy in terms of their
representation of meanings. They have instead gone
down the road of constructing this visual efﬁcacy in
terms of what effects and causes it indexes. This requires
that they remain open to the various ways artifacts can
achieve visual efﬁcacy, while recognizing that certain
objects with complex morphology might not express
complex meanings because they are just not in the
business of conveying rich semantic content.
On the other hand, Forge’s explanation of the power
of ambiguity serves as a persuasive example of how
nonmorphological aspects can contribute to an efﬁcacious
striking visibility, increasing the overall impact of the
art object. In the Abelam case the efﬁcacy of art objects
is achieved not only by means of formal effectiveness,
but also by means of a referential instability that creates
an aura of mystery around the objects. In other words,
the discrepancies and tensions described by Forge were
not meant only as stumbling blocks to be removed by the
anthropologist (in his case by introducing the concept of
autonomous visual communication) but also as features
contributing to the visual efﬁcacy of artifacts. Together
with the sheen of paint and the harmonious design, the
referential ambiguity contributes for Forge to the striking
visibility of the Abelam art objects and thus also to their
overall efﬁcacy. It is because they make it difﬁcult to
identify a stable referent, Forge claimed, that these objects
come to express for the Abelam the ancestrally sanctioned
coherence of their communal life.
Importantly, Forge’s critics do not deny that the
referential instability he described is involved in the
visual efﬁcacy of Melanesian images. Equally, it is not
their aim to show that, Losche’s remark notwithstanding,
Melanesian art objects really are just like refrigerators,
visually unremarkable to their audience. For O’Hanlon,
the referential instability and a general sense of uncertainty
creates the background against which the images’ affective
power is understood as a revelation (1992, 590, 605).
And although Losche thinks Forge disregarded the
functional nature of Abelam paintings and carvings, she
does not challenge Forge’s point that referential ambiguity
enhances the power of art and serves to symbolically
tie together different aspects of the Abelam world. Her
point that this tying together revolves around the shared
generative power of the references is an elaboration on
Forge’s argument rather than a wholesale refutation.
This serves to show that pragmatic approaches can
accommodate the insights garnered by semanticists like
Forge. Signiﬁcation is not completely discredited; it is
dethroned as the sole conceptual means of access to an
art object’s visual efﬁcacy.
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